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ABSTRACT 
Yupik and Inupiat villages in Alaska (the territory and the 
state) experienced a process of legal socialization that was 
strongly influenced by serious constraints in the allocation of 
resources. These constraints resulted in legal socialization 
into what was in essence a second legal state system and provided 
an opportunity for cultural autonomy by Eskimo villages even 
though this de facto situation did not recognize these groups as 
sovereign tribes. The actual implantation of a single full-blown 
legal system in village Alaska in the mid-1970's has resulted in 
a loss of control and serious efforts by Alaska villages to 
reinstitute village law ways as tribal legal process. 
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This paper will examine the historical, present and future 
interrelationship between Western law and social systems of 
Eskimo villages in Alaska. 
The historical analysis will encompass the period prior to 
statehood when a variety of military and civilian authorities 
introduced Western law into Alaska Inupiat and Yupik communities. 
The present for these same purposes will encompass two 
periods, that of the early statehood period, 1959-1970, and that 
of the oil boom and land claims era, 1971-1982. Clues to the 
future relationship begin to emerge in 1982 and thereafter. 
Eskimo Villages in Alaska - Communities of Resilience and Change 
Who are the Eskimos? 
Alaska's Native population, 16 percent of the total in 1980 
(U.S., Interior, 1984:E-5) includes 7,338 Inupiat, 17,474 Yupik 
and 5,174 Siberian Eskimos among its indigenous population of 
64,103 Indians, Aleut and Eskimos (1984:E-7). With few excep­
tions these Eskimo populations continue to live on village sites 
of long archeological duration, set close to land and water 
resources that remain critical components of village economy. In 
fact, thirty-five percent of Alaska Natives report that half or 
more of their food continues to come from subsistence resources 
(ISER, 1984:9). 
Residence in small, medium and large villages occurs among 
between 95 and 99 percent of Alaska Eskimos (U.S., Interior, 
1984:E-7). However, in two western and northern Inupiat regions, 
Native towns of 2,000 plus persons have attracted 38 percent 
(Kotzebue) and 53 percent (Barrow) of the resident Native popula­
tion. Thus, while net outmigration from villages to urban cities 
has been more than offset by high birth rates, internal migration 
within the discrete regions of Alaska continues to be noticeable 
and important. 
Average villages number from 300 to 700 persons, more than 
half of whom are children. 
The Early Period 
Inupiat and Yupik villages in Alaska have different histori­
cal patterns of development both socially and legally (see Case, 
1984:353-60). This paper wil focus on certain common factors in 
the development of relationship between these groupings and 
agents of Western law. 
As stated, both groups were and are heavily dependent upon 
hunting, fishing and gathering of other wild resources. Villages 
were, then, with few exceptions, not places to which Alaska 
Natives were removed to replace subsistence activity with govern­
ment rations, but rather staging areas for such activities. 
Villages were the places, then, where semiautonomous family 
groups came together and rubbed elbows. Historically and in the 
present day, family groupings determine residence patterns in 
most villages. 
The literature of legal anthropology often serves up Eskimo 
peoples as primary cultural examples of peoples without law, 
living in states of primitive anarchy (see Hoebel, 1954 and 
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Pospisil, 1964). The focus for these scholars and their apparent 
litmus test has been the existence of extra-familial institutions 
and figures (e.g., leaders) capable of settling public disputes 
with secular sanctions and at the same time articulating rules 
which will guide future relationships within the larger society. 
In this search for what is effectively supra-political struc­
tures, more subtle deinsti tutionali zed forms of law ways have 
been overlooked. 
If one examines the legal development of peoples such as the 
Eskimo whose structure of political organization and leadership 
was often temporal from the perspective of legal socialization, a 
more valuable and instructive assessment of village law and its 
association with Western law emerges. 
Socialization has been defined as a "developmental process 
through which persons acquire societal orientations and behavior 
patterns" (Tapp, 1970 quoted in Friedman, 1977:69). 
According to June Tapp and Felice Levine, legal 
socialization: 
delineates that aspect of the socialization process
dealing with the expression of legal beliefs and behav­
iors, the internalization of "rule" norms, the condi­
tions obtaining legal compliance, and the learning of 
deviant and compliant modes. It focuses on the develop­
ment of individual standards for making sociolegal
judgments and for using the legal network for resolving
conflicts, pressing claims, and settling disputes.
Covering the "positive" and "negative" sides of 
learning, specifically for the institution of law and 
generally for all human rule systems with authoritative 
validity, legal socialization considers both the pro­
cesses and products of reasoning about "legal" norms. 
Whether "law," "norm," or "rule" is used, each conveys 
some obligation and expectation of compliance; but none 
precludes the possibility of disobedience. (1977:85) 
It is evident then that even nonjural processes are capable 
of instilling in members of a cultural group both a normative 
focus and predispostions regarding the appropriate ways to avoid 
or engage other persons when conflicts (or potential conflicts) 
emerge in group living. 
The search for law, then, among groups less dependent on 
institutionalized law draws one down pathways that are often 
those not taken by political and legal anthropologists. Child 
rearing, for example, has attributes of legal socialization among 
its many purposes (Briggs, 1970; Conn and Hippler, 1973a). So 
does the etiquette of hunting sessions and other rituals normally 
viewed as nonlegal by Western eyes (Chance, 1966 and Graburn and 
Strong, 1973). 
Eskimo law ways had at its core nonconfrontational, individ­
ualized underpinnings. In small groups individuals learned to 
read subtle cues in personal behavior ( see Conn and Hippler, 
1973b). Right behavior was taught through observation and 
through ritualistic lectures in men's houses in both Yupik and 
Inupiat society. Right behavior was strongly associated with 
appropriate readings of other known individuals, their patterns 
of relationships and dealings. Appropriate reactions or non­
reactions to breaches of etiquette were selected accordingly. 
Persons who did not act normally (that is, persons who gave off 
inappropriate cues) were considered not only deviant, but also 
crazy and dangerous. Security lay less in the capacity to call 
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into play a form of formal legal intervention than in a well­
developed capacity to read the meaning of another person's behav­
ior in time to avoid danger by nonconf rontation or to react to 
danger preemptively. 
For Eskimo society, then, strangers represented special 
threats. One did not know their motivations, formed as they were 
out of unknown alliances and, perhaps, obligations to undertake 
revenge (Spencer, 1959). Harmony within the group was formed by 
tensions in equapose, strengths and obligations in relative 
balance, and above all, knowledge of strengths and weaknesses 
widely shared among co-resident factions. 
Within a reference frame of a typical face-to-face society, 
gossip, ostracism and avoidance, all mainstays of classic social 
control, formed effective public remedies for deviance so long as 
the deviator was a person whose personal alliances and strength 
were not overpowering. In such a situation, a bully ( like a 
stranger) could cause ripples of unrest that ended only with 
removal of the offender or withdrawal of the persons offended. 
Western Legal Socialization: Early Agents of Change 
Intervention by agents of governmental authority varied among 
Alaska regions .1 However, patterns of change in the Yukon­
Kuskokwim area and on the Northern and Western coasts of Alaska 
show significant similarities (Oswalt, 1967). 
In Inupiat Alaska, villages experienced, by the late 19th 
century, the beginning of a trait which could be said to be the 
hallmark of Western law for small settlements, seasonal and 
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sporadic intervention by agents of American criminal law who 
sought and discovered law violators served up by non-Natives or 
by village councils (Murton, 1965). Once discovered, these 
violators were removed from the community for lengthy periods 
and, often, forever. The Coast Guard cutters were an early 
expression of this phenomenon, fixated as they were with control 
of guns and liquor (Healy, 1889). Territorial marshalls and 
agents for the suppression of liquor among the Indians were later 
examples; state troopers were but a final example of the same 
form of Western law. 
Yupik villages experienced this same process although in 
slower stages, prompted not by whaling but by early gold strikes 
and the missionary process. 
This pattern of authoritative intervention from outside the 
community was coupled with efforts by teachers and missionaries 
on the scene to institutionalize law (Jenness, 1962). The result 
of this effort was the first Eskimo legal institution, the 
village council. 
For these Western law figures, councils appeared to be less 
law-givers than intermediaries drawn together as a coalition of 
principal groups within the community. In some Yupik villages at 
an earlier time, the Russians had recruited traditional leaders 
as the Tsar's representatives (Case, 1984:359). Whether because 
of epidemics which shattered older groupings among Yupik, or 
because of more accurate perceptions that leaders among Eskimos 
were effectively leaders among equals, the council format was 
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introduced as a device to reorder Eskimo village societies to the 
needs of education and missionary programs. Early rules of these 
institutions were so loaded with matters of practical importance 
to teachers and missionaries, especially concerns of the school, 
that some commentators have dismissed village councils as little 
more than colonial instruments (Milan, 1964). 
However, a close perusal of council records of more than 
fifty years duration suggests that these bodies were sufficiently 
flexible to allow participants to draw on their own approaches to 
problem disposition in ways that were not disruptive of earlier 
forms of social control (Ulgunik, 1946-70). 
In other papers, I have described council process in some 
detail (Conn, 1975; Conn and Hippler, 1973b, 1974b, 1975). 
However, suffice it to say here that social control over minor 
problems was given a point of denouement that had previously 
existed only in the men's house and in smaller group settings. 
Within the council a group consensus could be formed and those 
persons with whom other forms of social control had not succeeded 
could be confronted with their deviance and allowed to confess 
and be reintegrated into the society. 
Eskimo councils worked as transitional institutions for both 
Western agents of authority and indigenous peoples while other 
neocolonial Indian courts remained the fixtures of those who 
imposed them (Conn and Hippler, 1974b). That they were success­
fully grafted onto the developing legal socialization of Eskimos 
is best evidenced by their continuing viability even in later 
years when overt support for councils dropped away and government 
policy shifted focus to Western courts and police. 
The success of councils seems to have stemmed in part from 
their coherent integration with political patterns of old and new 
settlements. Little or no attempt was made by agents of change 
to stack families and clans into leadership and follower roles. 
The traditional process of dispute adjustment, one that was 
distinctly nonadversarial and that allowed for redemption without 
punishment was another feature of council justice: it allowed 
for appropriate responses by both deviant and those who commented 
on deviance as representatives of the community (Conn and 
Hippler, 1975). The parlance of council justice was often that 
of Western courts. Ordinances were described and punishments 
were set. But, as often as not, the process of council justice 
was not carried through to punishment unless such punishment 
could be understood as entirely justified by preexistent social 
relationships (e.g. , when elders punished young people or when 
insiders instructed persons with limited connections to the 
community). This council procedure with its emphasis on con­
fession and contrition also reflected the less than legal 
socialization of missionaries who sought contrition from sinners. 
Finally, and most importantly, the shadow of another system 
fell over councils from their inception and backstopped councils 
in areas where their own restrained approach may not have suf­
ficed. 
Agents of education, the Coast Guard, the military and 
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finally secular territorial law focused their attention on 
violent behavior, serious offenses by and against non-Natives 
and, above all, the complex issue of drinking and violence 
related to drinking (Conn, 1980). These matters were served up 
to Western law interveners; these serious offenders were removed 
for punishment in distant courts. 
Western law was introduced to Inupiat and Yupik villages with 
a distinct and limited focus. Drinking and drinking behavior was 
viewed as the primary source of trouble among indigenous peoples. 
Other apsects of law - its civil side, for example - were hardly 
apparent in Eskimo villages until the 1970s. Western law as it 
arrived in Eskimo villages and when it arrived was about the 
suppression, use and sale of hootch and little else. 
Further, whatever its ritualistic content, Western law served 
as a vehicle for removal of off enders. Whatever happened to 
offenders, they were removed for extended periods during which 
tempers could cool and feuds could be put to rest. 
In another paper, I have argued that the impact of prohibi­
tionary policy of Western law, the counterpoint to drunken behav­
ior taught Alaska Natives by other non-Natives who drank around 
them, had a powerful negative influence on development of mean­
ingful controls within the Eskimo groups (Conn, 1980). However, 
the point most relevant here is that Eskimos were taught by a 
steady stream of Western law agents that (1) drinking behavior 
could not be controlled by individual Eskimos or by Eskimo groups 
if it began and that (2) Western legal institutions were the pri-
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mary actors in hootch (and later liquor) suppression. 
What Western agents of law taught by word and by deed was 
confirmed by the inner logic of Eskimo law ways. Eskimos who 
drank became different persons. As such they were indifferent to 
social cues and seemingly immune from punishment for inappropri­
ate behavior. 
When non-Na ti ves suggested that Eskimos who drank "did not 
know what they were doing," Natives were prepared to believe it 
so subtle and complex was their system of law ways (Conn, 1985b). 
Councils functioned, then, within a halo of externally 
imposed Western law that kept hootch manufacture and consumption 
to a minimum and that removed violent, repeat offenders. As such 
councils were left with matters involving rational persons who 
could be counseled and advised to behave in ways which would not 
result in conflict. Councils often focused on embryonic 
conflicts, all but invisible to non-residents who had not moni­
tored as closely interpersonal relationships. 
With all of this emphasis on council process, one should 
never forget that most problems among Eskimos, both Yupik and 
Inupiat, remained outside of the domain of either village coun­
cils or Western law. Critical issues of resource sharing and 
wildlife management remained outside of this sphere as did most 
matters of intra-familial conflict. What village councils dealt 
with usually involved matters with the potential of being trans­
formed into Western law violations at some point in their matura­
tion. Whom councils dealt with was equally important. Persons 
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selected for council justice had failed to pick up cues comrnuni­
ca ted through other forms of social control. If they were not 
strangers to the village, they were at least persons who had 
social ties of less significance to the group. 
Village councils emerged as vehicles to reinforce traditional 
social control and to act on legal matters not deemed suitable 
for official intervention. Councils bound social control and law 
together. But as their role became more legal and less bound to 
social control, this critical balance of legal cultures was lost 
in Eskimo villages. 
Late Territorial and Early State Period 
It is often forgotten how significant non-legal changes are 
to legal process. In the late territorial period and early 
statehood period changes in population and sources of -economic 
development in towns brought to the fore the limits of a system 
of combined village and state justice which had worked effec­
tively for many years. 
In another paper, I describe critical meetings held between 
the Association of Village Council presidents and state officials 
in the early days of statehood (see Conn, 1982). 
Village council presidents came together to share notes on 
ways to control an upsurge in liquor consumption from the 
emerging regional center of Bethel. They spoke of young men 
going to Bethel for wage earning jobs and drowning on the way 
home after initial encounters with Bethel bootleggers. They 
sought revalidation from federal and state representatives of 
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their commitment to suppress liquor use within their villages and 
council authority to act as fining and jailing courts when liquor 
appeared in their villages. 
They were told that council justice was illegal and that 
Western intervention would be limited to liquor-related occur­
rences after they happened. As will be seen, they were promised 
police intervention if they employed rules similar to state stat-
utes. But no other formal authorization of their authority was 
granted. 
More than the legal status of councils had changed. Their 
source of assistance from Western police agents faded at the pre-
cise time when changing birth rates, migration patterns within 
the region (e.g., strangers within the village) and availability 
in Bethel of wages and liquor made the friendly isolation of 
villages a less dependable buffer against too many problems, 
especially too many problems that were liquor-related ( Tussing 
and Arnold, 1969). 
Further, the state of Alaska had a different legal agenda for 
bush Alaska. The new state had inherited a mandate from Congress 
that it provide exclusive criminal law jurisdiction (Case, 
1984). The new state equated law enforcement with sovereignty. 
Its policymakers were less prepared than agents of territorial 
law to share power officially with Native groups. If the state's 
resources were insufficient to deal with problems in more than 
200 geographically isolated villages, it was not prepared to say 
so. Policymakers assumed that as time progressed, its legal 
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mechanisms and its legal agents would be sufficient to cover the 
Alaska environment. 
The Yupik village leaders who met in Bethel did not focus on 
their right to mete out law and order as an end to itself. 
Instead, they persistently focused upon development of a 
realistic working relationship between village law and agents of 
state law. Their attention was riveted upon problems of disinte­
grative violence and means appropriate to resolve them. They 
viewed state responsibility in liquor prohibition as central -
that was the law's role after all (Conn, 1982). The Alaska and 
federal representatives focused upon what was authorized under 
state law and what was not authorized ignoring nearly completely 
the paucity of resources the state could focus on 57 Southwestern 
Alaska villages and 29,000 people scattered among them. Ignored 
also were legal expectations developed in more than a half cen­
tury of legal occurrences. 
The critical di vision between law as a symbol of authority 
and law as a means to anticipate and curb violence was to confuse 
every dialog between Eskimos and Alaskans from that time forward. 
Critical Factors in the Oil Boom and Land Claims Era and Their 
Bearing Upon the Relationship Between Social Structure and Law 
No period of time has seen as many external and internal 
forces at work on Alaska village life than the decade-and-a-half 
of the present era. What follows is not taken to be a comprehen­
sive assessment. Rather, those matters selected are chosen 
because (with the wisdom of hindsight) they are clearly forces 
-13-
which have affected and will affect the relationship between law 
and the social system of villages for decades to come. 
A. The Younger Population Emerges as a Social Force 
In the culmination of a trend beginning in the 1950s and 
1960s, infant mortality dropped 29 percent between 1970 and 1980 
(ISER, 1984: 4). The Indian Heal th Service's campaign to eradi­
cate tuberculosis, influenza and other respiratory diseases also 
bore fruit. The net result (along with outmigration by some 
employable younger adults) has been to make of village adults a 
minority group wedged between larger populations of young and 
old. Accidents, suicides and homicide replaced infectious 
diseases as the leading causes of death (Kraus, 1977). 
The youthful population in Alaska villages became over the 
decade of the 1970s a year round population. In what was the 
first of several political initiatives within the state political 
system, Alaska Natives pressed for and received high school 
systems in smaller villages. No longer would young people who 
desired secondary school education leave the village for a 
regional town or distant city. Now 92 new high schools appeared 
in villages, managed by regional school boards based in the 
towns (Parry, 1983). 
B. The Emergence of Town-Based Government and Quasi-Governmental 
Corporations 
Towns which had served as regional centers for limited 
federal health and social services emerged in the decade as the 
staging points for state services of every kind, including state 
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law services. The town-village relationship became more signifi­
cant than the relationship between distant urban centers and the 
bush when deli very of services and matters of local government 
were concerned. On the North Slope, an organized borough govern­
ment, fueled with tax revenues from oil exploration, displaced 
the state with a regional government that provided police and 
health and welfare services unlike any experienced by the seven 
villages in years previously (McBeath and Morehouse, 1980). The 
state was induced to provide a superior court judge, district 
attorney and public defender to the town and region by the 
upsurge in law enforcement and consequential rise in recorded 
criminal law violations. 
In the nearby Western NANA region with its ten villages, the 
town of Kotzebue emerged as a regional center without the deline-
ation of an organized borough. In this town, as in Dillingham, 
Nome and Bethel in other regions, nonprofit corporations emerged 
as quasigovernmental institutions. These entities, the forerun­
ners of for-profit corporations which had been defined in the 
land claims process, now drew upon Congressional legislative 
authority and state political clout generated by land claims to 
take over authority for management of many federal and state 
programs. 
Educated Natives, especially females, found work in town­
based bureaucracies. Thirty-nine percent of rural Natives worked 
in local or state government by 1980, up 17 percent in a decade 
(ISER, 1984:9). So also did non-Natives. Their numbers in rural 
Alaska increased by 64 percent while Natives increased by 18 per-
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cent (U.S., Interior, 1984:IV-10). More significantly, the num-
bers of non-Natives versus Natives in rural Alaska changed from 
50,900 to 39,000 in 1970 to 81,000 to 46,000 in 1980 (Id.) 
Non-Natives were the primary recipients of state jobs in the 
bush and even of jobs in Native corporations. As law services 
and other services increased, so did permanent or at least semi­
permanent non-Native presence in both towns and villages. The 
developed sense that non-Natives were effectively "taking over" 
coupled with a perception that leading families of Alaska Natives 
had assumed positions of power in town-based governments and 
regional corporations, laid the basis for the changes in village 
political process which will certainly determine the relationship 
between local law and village life in the next decade. 
C. Emergence of Controls Upon Hunting and Fishing 
At least as significant as the failure of criminal law agents 
to intervene when needed was the apparent implantation of legal 
controls on hunting and fishing. Northern and Western Inupiat 
who had hunted caribou year round above the Yukon River now 
discovered that fish and game controls would be imposed upon them 
in the name of conservation. Laws which had lain unenforced on 
the books were now enforced to protect migratory waterfowl and 
sea mammals. 
When Alaska Federation of Native-sponsored teams surveyed 
villages on bush justice problems in the mid-1970s, they discov-
ered more complaints about fish and wildlife enforcement than 
about treatment of Native crime and criminal law defendants (see 
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McKenzie, 1976). 
It appeared to village people that state and federal law 
showed more concern for fish and animal life than for village 
people. 
The Process of Legal Change During the Claims Settlement 
Decade 
The decade of the land claims settlement began with what 
could be described as a commonly shared perception by villagers 
and policymakers that bush or rural Alaska was ill-served by the 
state legal process. 
Three "bush justice" conferences were held in the decade. 
Although each one was dominated by a different constituency (the 
first, high policymakers and academics, the second, villagers and 
legal services attorneys and the third, line bureaucrats), there 
was a remarkable consistency in the resolutions which flowed from 
each session. 
First and foremost were expressions of felt neglect. At no 
time in the state's history had reliable legal services been 
available to small villages. Villagers complained less about the 
quality of services delivered than of the failure to provide 
them (Alaska Judicial Council, 1970). 
As I have discussed in other papers, federal law enforcement 
assistance appropriations and later state appropriations tended 
to increase the power of highly centralized state bureaucracies. 
Town-based teams of judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys 
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(with corrections officers) brought a rapid increase in criminal 
justice activity into nearly every region (Conn, 1985a). 
At the village level, however, every extension of state serv­
ice brought increased levels of disempowerment and frustration. 
What had been a notable characteristic of the decades prior to 
statehood and the first decade thereafter - derivative power lent 
to small villages to carry out dispute settlement and social 
control - now evaporated as state service implanted itself in the 
towns. The state legal apparatus developed "eyes and ears" in 
the villages by hiring "parapolice" and "parajudges" whose pri­
mary function was to hold the scene for town-based professionals 
and to report law violations by village councils who sought to 
take the law into their own hands (Conn, 1984). The extra-legal 
activity of village councils which had been the mainstay of both 
village and state legal authority in an earlier time now was 
suppressed unless it could be cast as a form of diversion from 
state legal authority and controlled in that context. 
Although the shared point of view among justice policymakers, 
Native consumers and academicians was that the system of Western 
law implanted in rural Alaska did not meet adequately basic needs 
of citizens within the realms of law enforcement and dispute 
settlement, constituencies had fundamentally different senses of 
the root causes of the problem and its appropriate solution. 
Policymakers understood the problem as a failure of the 
Alaska village people to understand Western law and its operative 
premises. This failure was rooted in "cultural difference," most 
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especially the education Alaska Natives were presumed to have 
received in their own law ways, an education which had effec­
tively miseducated them in Western legal terms. 
A solution to the problems of law services posited by policy­
makers and acted upon by academicians was to study traditional 
law ways and, drawing upon these studies, to reeducate Alaska 
Natives to Western law. Traditional law would be a basis for 
comparisons. 
Such studies were accomplished (Conn and Hippler, 1973a). 
However, what they revealed was that traditional law ways had 
already been substantially influenced by interaction with agents 
of Western law. In fact, the purported clash between "tradi­
tional law ways" and "Western law" was at base a clash between a 
village legal process mutated and redesigned to fit the demands 
of earlier agents of Western law during a period of benign 
neglect of Native villages with a new definition of law services 
initiated by urban justice bureaucracies who had only recently 
discovered bush Alaska. 
Thus conflicts over bush justice were not cultural conflicts 
except as they conveyed a conflict between two historical epochs 
of Alaska legal culture, an epoch of territorial and early state­
hood and an epoch of modernization fueled by oil wealth and a 
claims settlement. 
The assumption of many town-based officials that village 
councils could carry out all matters of legal activity, drawing 
upon consensual authority only, had proven to be erroneous. 
There was significant division between young and old over 
drinking behavior. Younger people had learned to question the 
legitimacy of village council authority. 
In short, councils had seen their historical authority to act 
stretched beyond its limits and its credibility questioned and 
undercut both by young people and by outside agents of law who 
happened to observe it. 
If this pattern of events had not caused councils to reject a 
central role in legal process, another change would have lead to 
the same result. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act favored 
villages who incorporated as second class cities with title to 
townships within the village core (Conn and Garber, 1981). At 
the same time, state revenue sharing and state appropriations 
favored villages who were transformed juridically into mini­
cities. As a result the village council of yesteryear became the 
city council of the 1970s. Each day's mail plane brought letters 
from state and federal agencies and a workload which caused coun­
cils to look for someone else to handle the cat and dog problems 
of village conflict which had taken up winter evenings and days 
in years previously. 
Finally, many villagers shared the belief of state officials 
that the best solution to their problems was total incorporation 
into and dependence upon the state legal process. Whether this 
meant placement of a state justice of the peace into the village 
to take over hearings or simply more frequent visitation of state 
judges to the village, legal process was not then identified with 
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something as illusive as tribal "sovereignty." It was simply an 
activity that the state was charged with accomplishing. It was 
the state's job to do. 
When academicians wrote that justices of the peace in small 
villages did not handle problems in the way that councils did or 
that people expected, justice policymakers showed marked dis­
interest. After all, they concluded, what state judges did was 
correct and what councils did was illegal and incorrect. 
Villagers also were unimpressed. Law was the state's busi­
ness and it should spend money and energy sufficient to hire 
someone to do the job. 
The earlier epoch, marked as it was by benign neglect of 
village Alaska, had also allowed Eskimo villages to use village 
councils as the focal point of institutionalized village social 
control. Those who decided to tolerate autonomy in matters of 
law by village councils had not been policymakers of justice 
agencies, but rather embattled field operatives in rural towns 
who simply could not take on caseloads of other than the most 
serious criminal law offenses. 
The academicians who studied bush justice in the 1970s tended 
to embrace a pattern of continuing semi-autonomy in matters of 
village law (Conn, 1974a, 1975). They suggested that a formal-
ized entity which handled disputes in a "council-like" fashion 
could probably anticipate and prevent many violent encounters 
through early intervention (Conn and Hippler, 1974b). They saw 
as the ideal form of law for modern villages a continuation of 
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the pragmatic working relationship between community law and 
town-based state personnel, with some rational division of 
authority struck between village and town, based on the problems 
to be addressed and the resources and approach best suited to 
deal with the problems. What this implied, however, was that 
each justice bureaucracy reconsider the law jobs and machinery to 
be offered to bush Alaska, redefining those roles and legal 
mechanisms to fit the consumer and not anticipating that con­
sumers and their communities would adapt to fit the law jobs and 
machinery proffered. 
The academicians point of view was not accepted by either 
justice policymakers or by villagers. 
Village leaders in the 1970s were not committed to the prin­
ciples of autonomy or even community control of law problems. 
What they had experienced in the name of community control was a 
process which had forced village councils to handle problems they 
believed should be left to outside authorities. Because of inef­
fective police intervention, even after repeated requests for 
assistance, councils had been transformed into courts that 
threatened fines and other sanctions that one and all knew were 
unenforceable and even illegal rather than deal with matters 
suitable to compromise (Conn, 1982). 
This point of view which governed village ideas about law and 
the way it should be accomplished was itself a product of living 
with an ongoing relationship between village processes of social 
control and state processes. Without planning or intent, the 
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state had reconstructed a working relationship after statehood 
based upon the limited resources available in state hands. Its 
representatives, usually state troopers or, later, assistant 
district attorneys, developed and distributed "village rules" 
which could be imposed on two or three occasions in minor cases 
without first notifying the trooper. After several tries, the 
council was to call into play trooper intervention (Conn, Id.) 
This mutual responsibility for law in the villages allowed 
the state to concentrate on more serious matters, presumably 
allowing village councils to handle the lion's share of problems. 
Villagers were given the impression in meetings with state and 
federal offcials that this approach, though illegal, would pass 
muster on the village side. There, it was assumed, that village 
consent, backstopped by trooper authority, would convince vil­
lagers to abide by village law in most, if not all, cases. There 
was no allusion to a basis for village law, civil or criminal, in 
tribal authority even when villages could demonstrate that they 
had been organized as Indian tribes under the Federal Indian 
Reorganization Act (Case, 1984). Villages which did not seek 
much outside intervention were viewed as "progressive villages," 
those which took care of their own problems. The issue of how 
problems were resolved was not vital; limitations of demands upon 
town-based officials was considered most significant. 
The working relationship between state and village legal pro­
cess broke down almost as soon as it was crafted into place. The 
state could never live up to its responsibilities because the 
numbers and diversity of problems for which intervention was 
demanded outran the state's resources. Village councils lost 
credibility when pressed to demonstrate that they could apply 
ultimate sanctions, like jai 1 terms and fines, and not merely 
mediate and prevent trouble, they failed either to carry through 
or to draw into play a Western legal process which would carry 
through. 
Youth, whose education in Western law, as urban law, began 
with VISTA volunteers who questioned council authority and con­
tinued through social sciences courses, movies and finally 
satellite TV, did not perceive that the counseling experienced 
before village councils was 11 law 11 as Americans understood it. 
If so many other factors had not caused village law to erode, 
the magnitude of drinking problems, problems associated with 
town-based bootleggers and town-based wage opportunities, 
improving transportation and communication, made the business of 
law too generalized and frequent for a council whose only rock of 
support was its ability to draw upon village consent. 
Village Natives looked for Native and non-Native figures to 
intervene and deal with their problems as paid state employees. 
Law became a job like any other and less directly a tribal or 
ci vie duty, a job with considerably less financial or social 
rewards than the negative social connotations ascribed to it and 
to those who took it up. 
The State of Alaska, organized constitutionally, into highly 
centralized bureaucratic units for the delivery of policing, 
judging, lawyering and correction ran vertical lines into vil-
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lages by means of para-police, para-judges and other aides when 
it was necessary to implant any representative of their bureauc­
racy (Conn, 1985b). Agency efforts concentrated on the building 
up of town-based systems in the regions. 
Villages were perceived as places lacking physical and human 
resources sufficient to establish urban justice systems (see 
Second Magistrate Advisory Committee, 1978, 1979). Through pro­
fessional education, and then through bureaucratic alignment and 
pay, efforts was made to focus the loyalty and identity of state 
magistrates and village police (through several programmatic per­
mutations) on their parent agencies, the court or department of 
public safety, rather than upon their village and its government. 
With this in mind, it may be easier to see how a village such 
as X on the North Slope and state justice planners could arrive 
at very much the same conclusion: that law was state law and no 
other law and that state law jobs were for state employees to 
accomplish. 
X had carried forth a form of council justice for more than 
seventy years as its records could attest when a local personage 
was nominated to be magistrate in the early 1970s. From the 
first day of his employment, the council rejected further 
complaints made to it. Even when complainants returned to state 
that each did not want to file a written complaint or to put 
anyone in jail or have him fined, the council refused to handle 
matters arguing that the state employee should handle the job. 
When few cases appeared on the magistrate's roster for 
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several years, the court system removed the post from X and 
dismissed the magistrate, retrieving its typewriter, law books 
and government forms. 
Only after this occurred did the council, grudgingly return 
to the business of hearing disputes, requesting repeatedly that 
the magistrate post be returned (Conn, 1975). 
The same village turned over its policy authority to a 
oroughwide police authority. For years it had complained about 
nadequate police service from a single trooper in Barrow. When 
he borough did not, at first, respond with its promised police 
ervice, juvenile vandalism and break-ins caused resident 
eachers to panic. The council merely referred teachers to the 
orough Assembly. 
b
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Policing by the borough did finally come to the seven vil-
lages on the North Slope including X. Because this transfer-
mation of a Western law service was the only one accomplished by 
rural Natives, what occurred is instructive. It revealed 
something about the influence of deprivation. The North Slope 
Borough introduced areawide policing in a bush region without 
parallel in Alaska. Trooper-type officers, virtually all 
non-Native from out of state, were placed in two-man contingents 
in each village. A ten man plus unit began to patrol the 2,500 
person town of Barrow (Conn and Boedeker, 1983). 
Spiraling crime statistics and quantum leaps in protective 
custody apprehensions for drunken behavior would cause scholars 
to conclude later than social upheaval had come with oil reve-
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nues (Klausner and Foulks, 1982). In fact, what occurred would 
occur in any small town or community assuming levels of policing 
take a quantum leap. The clearance rates for crimes reported 
(when tabulated) were such that nearly every reported crime 
resulted in an arrest (Moeller, 1979). 
The North Slope villages moved from a period of historical 
underpolicing to overpolicing. Even then, village councils did 
not intervene to mediate or divert any of these arrests nor did 
they request to do so. 
Policing in villages in the rest of the state was increased 
through training of village police and then through indirect 
hiring by the Department of Public Safety of Village Public 
Safety Officers. These VPSOs were paid through state appropria­
tions to nonprofit Na ti ve corporations based in the towns, but 
were trained and directed by state troopers (Sellin, 1981). 
Here, as with state magistrates and North Slope Borough 
police, control and guidance of law officers was said to be in 
the hands of town-based police and not in community hands. As 
village police were transformed into persons not merely trained 
but paid by the state, their role was narrowed from that of a 
typical American policeman in a small community who carries arms 
and makes arrests to that of unarmed agent of the trooper, pre­
pared to hold the scene until troopers arrived to investigate and 
make arrests. 
Throughout this transformation of bush justice in the 1970s, 
councils found not only that they were relieved of responsibility 
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for doing "law work," but that they were rarely consulted on mat­
ters of law in their communities. Troopers intervened when they 
decided to intervene. Legal figures came and went. Consultation 
with councils became ritualistic and pro forma if it occurred. 
Despite repeated requests by councils that they be informed 
when and on what conditions that released defendants would be 
returned to their home villages, officials in towns usually 
ignored councils when such decisions on release were made or when 
such information was communicated. Similarly, when it was 
suggested that councils be involved in sentencing, a corrections 
officer polled a council and had each member vote on preselected 
terms of years to which a defendant might be sentenced rather
than obtaining from the council a more subjective assessment of
the defendant's place within the village. 
Councils were employed only when defense attorneys or prose­
cutors wanted to stress village opinion in the context of an 
individual case. 
At the same time, justice professionals systematically warned 
their underlings (professional and paraprofessional) in towns and
villages that village ordinances were illegal in content or in
preparation, that village police departments were untrained and 
that village law systems were constitutionally suspect. 
The Local Option Law and its Rationale 
In 1980 rural legislators lobbied into state law legislation 
which allowed villages to vote on several forms of local alcohol 
regulation, among them an option which provided that a village 
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could prohibit the importation (though not the private and per­
sonal use) of alcohol (Lonner and Duff, 1983). 
Villages viewed this local option as an exercise in local 
control, not unlike the authority each had enjoyed when in terri­
torial days, each could outlaw the manufacture and possession of 
hootch under federal law. 
What villagers discovered, however, was that this local 
option, a formalized grant of state authority, was narrow and 
circumscribed. Importers of liquor had to be caught with valid 
search warrants. Liquor slipped into town as before and did not 
make villages dry or give the village control over liquor use. 
The reaction to this law is important for viewing the future 
of law in rural Alaska through the prism of legal socialization 
or living with the law as it has been experienced in nearly one 
hundred years of village associations with agents of Western law. 
Frustration with the state system's inability to generate 
local controls on drinking and drinking behavior have caused 
villages to meet to discuss non-legal solutions and non-state 
solutions (Justice Center, 1985). 
Native Alaska villages, including Inuit and Yupik villages, 
now appreciate the limits of service that can be provided by 
state agencies which are town-based. Not only drinking behavior, 
but also youth problems and drugs concern these villagers. 
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Juvenile Matters 
In territorial days, U.S. Cornmi ssioners ( local justices of 
the peace) sentenced youthful offenders to out-of-state institu­
tions and took the position that juveniles should be housed at 
federal expense (Moeller, 1942:1-5) in Murton, 1968). There were 
no juvenile reformatories in the territory and no territorial 
funds employed to deal with Native delinquents. As a result, 
extra-legal council proceedings about juvenile behavior were sup­
ported by officials. However, after statehood came the transfer 
of juvenile matters to state superior courts where, it was 
thought, more "helping" resources existed. Unfortunately, 
superior courts were not located in rural places other than Nome 
until the mid-1970s when Kotzebue, Bethel and Barrow were added. 
The net result was that juvenile process reached the towns long 
after this authority had been lost to village councils and a 
youth problem had begun. At best, youth services officers reach 
very serious matters in small villages, leaving all other juve­
nile problems neglected. The Western system has ignored, then, 
the demographic bulge of youth in Eskimo and other Native vil-
lages while denying authority to councils or even state magis­
trates to act in anything other than emergencies ( see Parry, 
1983). 
Eskimo juveniles and their elders have discovered, then, that 
the law affecting them has diminished in impact with the transfer 
from village justice to state authority. 
The pervasive absence of village control over community con­
cerns has begun to impress rural villagers. This concern relates 
           
       
        
       
       
        
        
          
       
         
         
        
         
         
          
       
          
          
         
         
          
      
       
        
 
to many matters, not those of law only but also to schools now 
organized and guided by town-based regional education attendance 
areas and to other youth needs including recreation. Concern 
with state regulation of local subsistence activities after 
futile attempts to influence developmental decisions have also 
given rise to an increased demand for local authority. 
Tribal Governments - The Next Step? 
I think it critical to understand that Alaska Native villages 
did not consistently press for tribal legal autonomy as the rela­
tionships between villages and state law matured. If anything, 
they seemed acquiescent in the replacement of their own instru­
ments for ordering by less effective but official state agencies. 
Villages pressed for more control and autonomy through the 
local option law and more recently through tribal government
because the villages discovered that the state was not true to 
its own ideology or legal commitment to serve all citizens. The 
court stopped placing magistrates into villages leaving about 130 
with no local judicial officer to handle small criminal, civil or 
juvenile matters. The state police were satisfied in the end to 
place parapolice in small villages to "hold the scene. 11 In 
pressing matters such as juvenile behavior, the state was pre­
pared to place no youth services officers in small villages where 
nearly 30 percent of Alaska youth reside. 
Out of frustration, then, villages have reconsidered their 
roles as arbiters of legal matters. This discontent has had 
several allies. 
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Since 1980 the numbers of young Native inmates in state jails 
has doubled from 16 to 34 percent (Alaska, Division of 
Corrections, 1984). The reasons are many. However, some inmates 
see ineffective village law as a primary reason for their own 
fate. These inmates now press for reforms of bush justice. 
The deadlines in the claims settlement bill have set in 
motion initiatives aimed at protecting Native lands. One ini-
tiative has been to revitalize moribund tribal governments. Thus 
tribal sovereignty has become the rallying point for those who 
desire improved and village-based government services, those 
hostile to the regions and the state and those desirous of pro­
tecting land and resources from outside regulation, from taxation 
and from legal claims against Native corporations whose invest­
ments have soured, corporations that own the land in rural 
Alaska. 
In 1982 village leaders from more than 70 communities formed 
the United Tribes of Alaska. Their touchstone was "tribal 
sovereignty," a concept long recognized as a core attribute of 
Indian government in American federal Indian law. It signifies a 
residue of governmental powers which any tribal government can 
exercise unless or until those powers are explicitly removed by 
Congress (Strickland, 1982). Sovereignty exists in the context 
of the political relationship between the federal government and 
tribes, those semi-dependent domestic nations, recognized by the 
American constitution and by caselaw as a "third order of 
government." 
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The scope of tribal governmental authority in Alaska is murky 
at this juncture, given the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act's 
extinguishment of aboriginal land and hunting rights and that 
Act's refusal to set up reservations of land upon which tribes 
could govern (see Mintz, 1985). Yet Native leaders have taken 
Congress and its word at face value. They view ANCSA as a land 
settlement only and point to Pueblos in the American Southwest as 
examples of tribal communities which exist on other than lands 
held in trust by the federal government. 
When interviewed recently, UTA chairman, Shelton Katchatag 
described how sovereignty could be used as a governmental tool by 
Alaska people. Said Katchatag: 
Under sovereignty, governments can regulate subsistence 
economies, they can provide what are now called social 
services (including education, health, police and court 
services), they can tax, set the policies and directions 
for any enterprise (commercial or otherwise) the people
might choose to get into. The overall goal of a govern­
ment is to provide for the security and physical safety
of their members, guide an economic system whereby mem­
bers can not only have all the comforts of life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness, but also feel that their 
work as a group is productive and not just for them­
selves but for their community. (Katchatag, 1985:C-l) 
However, when asked for examples of current tribal governmen­
tal activity, Katachatag gave a single example of a youth court 
organized under the joint authority of the village of Sitka and 
the U.S. Congress by the terms of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 
1978 (which designates villages named in ANCSA as tribes for pur­
poses of the Act). 
Tribal governments are measured in American court cases, not 
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only by doctrinal assessments of sovereignty, but also by their 
acts as tribal governments. Put another way, tribes have learned 
that unless they use tribal authority, they may not be accorded 
legal status as tribes even if they are theoretically entitled to 
it. 
Alaska villages, with few exceptions, have allowed their 
tribal governmental roles to atrophy as city governments, 
regional governments and the state have taken over nearly every 
role of tribal government which Katchatag described. 
The issue, then, for tribes in Alaska is twofold. First, 
should each press for autonomous standing, a third order of 
government, dependent neither on state or federal authority? If 
this posture is sought as "sovereignty" in the American legal 
framework, it implies freestanding governmental authority that is 
not dependent upon delegations of power from either the state or 
federal government. Second, whether power is delegated or not, 
over what realms of govermental activity should tribes assert 
jurisdiction? 
Inupiat and Yupik villages in Alaska may not be at liberty to 
establish freestanding third orders of government. First, 
because given a federal court system that is aggressively hostile 
to expansive interpretations of tribal rights, the final decision 
on tribal sovereignty in Alaska may well be left to a political 
result within the halls of Congress, a result necessarily satis-
factory to the state as well as the tribes. Second, tribes will 
necessarily move forward with little or no expectation that eco-
nomic windfalls will favor their development. In fact, the 
momentum behind many tribal movements is distinctly non-
developmental, concerned as it seems with preservation of 
subsistence-based economies. 
Village governments in Alaska appear, however, to be overly 
modest when examples of their past governmental experience are 
requested. In fact, by acting as traditional governments and as 
city governments, local communities have very complex and active 
records as governments within their domains. 
Alaska Eskimos have adapted their own legal culture to that 
of Western law as they were taught it through a working rela­
tionship that developed in the 19th century. This is not to say 
that Eskimo legal culture is dead; it has evolved to meet the 
requirements of Western law. 
As tribal governments are considered, it will be important to 
recognize this evolution and not to substitute federal Indian law 
doctrine for a pragmatic assessment of this phenomenon. 
Specifically, the separate sovereign status of Alaska Native 
tribes under federal Indian law should not require that, once 
established, Alaska Native tribes "revive custom" or retreat in 
time to a pre-contact system of law ways. In the case of Alaska 
Natives, institutionalization of their legal systems did not 
occur until contact with Western law. Certainly no one would 
advocate the deinstitutionalization of Eskimo law as a necessary 
attribute of modern tribal sovereignty. Instead, the process of 
pragmatic development of that legal system should continue as 
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before with an eye toward Eskimo legal expectations, Eskimo 
problems and appropriate legal machinery in small, rural vil­
lages. 
Given the persistent influence of other legal authorities on 
villages' legal process over time, it is unlikely that villagers 
will seek more than a further refinement of their historical 
working relationship in delivery of governmental services. 
Al though this may not please ideologues on either the state or 
village's side, it will comport with law and government as vil­
lagers have been educated to it. The end result will be based 
upon a pragmatic assessment of problems and the best means to 
divide authority for their resolution. It will imply a formal 
division of power long resisted by state and federal authorities. 
However, it is not likely to involve a substantial reintroduction 
of customary approaches to dispute adjustment unless both village 
and state leaders are sold on their practical viability in what 
both perceive as the modern world. 
In short, both villages and the state have addressed matters 
of legal responsibility from a perspective which places high 
values on assimilation and pragmatism and not upon legal 
pluralism as more than a means to an end. 
There is little on the horizon to suggest that this process 
of legal socialization will cause either tribes or the state to 
change course. 
Tapp and Levine write of legal levels of legal socialization, 
drawing analogies from work by students of childhood education. 
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They suggest that persons should move from levels in which blind 
obedience to authority or compliance out of peer pressure give 
way to critical assessments of law and probing inquiries into the 
rational bases for laws. The latter dimension amounts to "legal 
1 i t e racy " ( Tapp and Lev in e , 19 7 4 ) • 
If one examines the interplay of Western law and village law 
among Eskimos there is little within the inner logic of the two 
to assist in developing legal literacy. Eskimo council justice 
lost its own logical basis as institutionalized social control as 
it became a tool of Western legal process. Western legal process 
appeared powerful but increasingly arbitrary and unreliable as 
its agents revealed their ignorance of their own system's earlier 
limited commitments to rural villagers. 
What has driven a new generation of Eskimos to a posture of 
demanding legal control over their own destiny is not the 
rationality of what they have experienced but its irrationality. 
Perhaps this is the only way that legal literacy - a desire 
to engage and manipulate the legal process - is achieved. 
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